The Philosophy of Political History in Oakeshott and Collingwood by Alexander J.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi �0.��63/�87��636-��34�3�8
journal of the philosophy of history �0 (�0�6) �79–303
brill.com/jph
The Philosophy of Political History  
in Oakeshott and Collingwood
James Alexander
Dept. of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara
jalexand@bilkent.edu.tr
Abstract
Every political philosopher has a philosophy of political history, if sometimes not a 
very good one. Oakeshott and Collingwood are two twentieth century political phi-
losophers who were particularly concerned with the significance of history for politi-
cal philosophy; and who both, in the 1940s, sketched what I call philosophies of 
political history: that is, systematic schemes which could make sense of the entire his-
tory of political philosophy. In this article I observe that Oakeshott depended for the 
political threefold sketched in his Introduction to Hobbes’s Leviathan on a threefold 
Collingwood had developed in relation to science in The Idea of Nature. This is, I think, 
a novel observation. I contrast this political threefold with Collingwood’s own political 
threefold in The New Leviathan. I then consider the neglect of these schemes, along 
with the rare attempts to defend such philosophies of history in the writings of 
Greenleaf and Boucher. My own claim is that these philosophies of political history are 
exemplary: and that the threefold is, for obvious Hegelian reasons, a still useful form 
for this sort of reflection. Political philosophy is likely to improve the more it takes the 
philosophy of political history seriously. 
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This is a contribution to something I would like to call the philosophy of politi-
cal history, that is, a contribution to the philosophy of history in relation to 
political philosophy. It begins by explicating a rather obscure, though I think 
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reasonably well known, passage in Oakeshott’s introduction to his edition of 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, first published in 1946 (also later published in Hobbes on 
Civil Association and the 1991 edition of Rationalism in Politics).1 It goes on to 
show how the threefold Oakeshott sketched in some brevity and one might say 
obscurity is wholly indebted to the account of the history of the philosophy of 
nature which Collingwood developed in his Idea of Nature, published in 1945. 
Collingwood’s purpose was wholly to explain something about the history of 
the philosophy of the natural sciences, which he supposed had moved through 
three stages. Oakeshott, who was less given to the philosophy of history than 
Collingwood2 – that is to say, was less inclined to impose the structures of his 
thought on history and more inclined to find the shapes of his thoughts in 
history – did not say that these were three stages, but said instead that they 
were three traditions, rival traditions, which had of course emerged at par-
ticular times. The novelty in Oakeshott was to take Collingwood’s threefold 
division of the stages of the history of the philosophy of nature and apply 
it to the traditions of the history of political philosophy. This was to put for-
ward a philosophy of political history: not one which took Hegelian or even 
Collingwoodian form, in terms of stages, but one which attempted to respect 
the history of political philosophy in such a way that justice could be done not 
only to what had been thought in the past but what ought to be thought now 
1   Michael Oakeshott, Introduction, in Hobbes Leviathan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), 
pp. vii–lxvi, also in Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association originally published in 
1975 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000), pp. 1–79, Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics 
and Other Essays ed. Timothy Fuller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), pp. 221–94.
2   I cannot go far into Oakeshott’s or Collingwood’s views about the philosophy of history here. 
In short, in the 1920s Collingwood argued that the philosophy of history was a confusing term 
because it had been used firstly for discovering laws in history and secondly for seeing his-
tory as the working out of a plan. The first, he thought, was a mistake; the second not: seeing 
history in terms of a plot was not the ‘philosophy of history’, he argued, but, simply, ‘history’. 
So ‘the philosophy of history’ was for Collingwood merely the philosophical consideration of 
the historical attempt to discover truth. Collingwood, ‘The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy 
of History’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 25 (1924–25), pp. 151–174, at pp. 155 & 161. 
Oakeshott agreed, and was even more emphatic about this. See Michael Oakeshott, What is 
History? and other Essays ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004), pp. 117–32 
& 201–06. This is all very well, but, clearly there is history and there is history. Most of what 
passes for history nowadays is not ‘seeing history as the working out of a plan’: so I think we 
can restore the term the ‘philosophy of history’ for history as the working out of stages or 
traditions – which would mean that Collingwood and Oakeshott were both, though they 
would not have admitted it, philosophers of history.
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in the present – a present complicated by the fact that we are so concerned to 
know what was thought in the past and understand it as belonging to the past. 
At one level this is a scholarly point. But this article is written for the rea-
son that I think all political philosophers and even historians of political phi-
losophy have silent philosophies of political history of one sort or another, 
sometimes not very good ones, and that it is the duty of anyone engaged in 
the serious study of political philosophy to bring such philosophies of political 
history to consciousness. I myself was educated at Cambridge by historians – 
eminently, Cowling, Dunn, Skinner, Tuck, Pagden, Hont, Runciman – and have 
spent much time reflecting on the status of the history of political thought. 
But I do not think that the ‘Cambridge School’ – such as it is – has ever man-
aged to explain satisfactorily why history matters as much as it is supposed to 
matter. By returning history to the philosophy of history I intend to indicate 
one reason why it does. There is not much to be derived from the history of 
political philosophy if we simply study fragments of it in miniature in order to 
irrelevantly decorate our current preoccupations. 
To make it absolutely clear what I am doing in this paper, the sections are 
as follows:
I Oakeshott’s paragraph on three political traditions from ‘Introduction to 
Leviathan’ (1946).
II How this is indebted to Collingwood’s three views of science from The 
Idea of Nature (1945).
III Oakeshott’s apparent abandonment of the political threefold except for a 
few references in his Lectures (1966–67).
IV The oddity of Collingwood’s alternative threefold philosophy of political 
history in New Leviathan (1942).
V Conclusion: how we have to try to make sense of the philosophy of politi-
cal history before we make sense of political philosophy.
It should become clear that, apart from a few attempts by Greenleaf and 
Boucher, not much has been done along the lines sketched by Collingwood 
and Oakeshott. This is not least because the sketches were different. But even 
if we admit the discordances, I think we should consider whether sketches 
like these are the only way to make the study of political history properly 
philosophical and the only way to prevent works about the history of political 
thought simply lapsing into mere chronicles of things that were thought. 
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I Oakeshott’s Paragraph on Three Political Traditions from 
‘Introduction to Leviathan’ (1946)
In the introduction to Leviathan, Oakeshott wrote a paragraph, which I quote 
at length so that his exact formulations may be read in full. I cannot be the 
only reader of this passage who has been at once overwhelmed by Oakeshott’s 
apparent achievement in summing up the entire history of political philoso-
phy and perplexed by his apparent disdain for explaining what he writes, if 
he came up with it himself, where he got it from, if he did not, and the reason 
for it. The style is about as ex cathedra as can be found in the writing of any 
twentieth-century political philosopher – even if the first word is a conditional 
‘If ’. (The conditionality of that ‘If ’ soon seems to be lost.)
If the unity of the history of political philosophy lies in a pervading sense 
of human life as a predicament and in the continuous reflection of the 
changing climate of the European intellectual scene, its significant vari-
ety will be found in three great traditions of thought. The singularities of 
political philosophies (like most singularities) are not unique, but follow 
one of three main patterns which philosophical reflection about politics 
has impressed on the intellectual history of Europe. These I call traditions 
because it belongs to the nature of a tradition to tolerate and unite an 
internal variety, not insisting upon conformity to a single character, and 
because, further, it has the ability to change without losing its identity. 
The first of these traditions is distinguished by the  master-conceptions 
of Reason and Nature. It is coeval with our civilisation; it has an unbro-
ken history into the modern world; and it has survived by a matchless 
power of adaptability all the changes of the European consciousness. The 
master-conceptions of the second are Will and Artifice. It too springs 
from the soil of Greece, and has drawn inspiration from many sources, 
not least from Israel and Islam. The third tradition is of later birth, not 
appearing until the eighteenth century. The cosmology it reflects in its 
still unsettled surface is the world seen on the analogy of human his-
tory. Its master-conception is the Rational Will, and its followers may be 
excused the belief that in it the truths of the first two traditions are ful-
filled and their errors find a happy release. The masterpiece of political 
philosophy has for its context, not only the history of political philosophy 
as the elucidation of the predicament and deliverance of mankind, but 
also, normally, a particular tradition in that history; generally speaking it 
is the supreme expression of its own tradition. And, as Plato’s Republic 
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might be chosen as the representative of the first tradition, and Hegel’s 
Philosophie des Rechts of the third, so Leviathan is the head and crown of 
the second.3 
Without the mention of these three representative texts at the end of the para-
graph I think the reader would be wholly lost. Mention of them lends author-
ity to what Oakeshott is saying. Plato’s Republic, Hobbes’s Leviathan, Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right: it is hard to think of three greater achievements in the 
history of political philosophy. Aristotle’s Politics has an undoubted claim. 
But Rousseau’s Social Contract falls a bit short, as do less complete works like 
Machiavelli’s Prince, Marx’s Communist Manifesto, Mill’s On Liberty, though 
they are all highly suggestive. Even the other great works of political philos-
ophy which I happen to admire – modern ones, like Oakeshott’s On Human 
Conduct, Collingwood’s New Leviathan, Schmitt’s Concept of the Political – are 
either, in the case of Schmitt, a brilliant insight into one element of politics or, 
in the cases of Oakeshott and Collingwood, compilations of brilliant sugges-
tions offered in elucidation of earlier writings and brought into some sort of 
incomplete system: they are all, indeed, indebted to the tradition of writing 
which runs from Plato to Hegel. (The fact that they are indebted in exactly this 
way is what, I hope the following observations will show, makes them modern.)
But to return to Oakeshott’s passage. This passage is frequently quoted by 
Oakeshott scholars but hardly ever subject to critical consideration.4 What we 
have here if we ignore the reference to the three great writings is the sugges-
tion that there are three traditions. Oakeshott has awkward names for them:
3   Oakeshott, ‘Introduction’, pp. xi–xii (also found in Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, 
pp. 7–8, and Rationalism in Politics, pp. 227–8).
4   See, for instance, Roy Tseng, The Sceptical Idealist: Michael Oakeshott as a Critic of the 
Enlightenment (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003), p. 191, and Kenneth McIntyre, The Limits 
of Political Theory: Oakeshott’s Philosophy of Civil Association (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 
2004), pp. 144–5 for a lack of criticism. Sometimes there is error, as when we are told that 
Oakeshott’s threefold is an account of three ‘stages’ rather than of three ‘traditions’ (as in The 
Cambridge Companion to Michael Oakeshott, p. 226). The only detailed consideration and use 
of the threefold is by David Boucher (about which see below). Most scholars of Oakeshott 
do not know what to make of the threefold. Ian Tregenza comments that Oakeshott ‘never 
fills in the detail of this history in the way Hegel, or indeed, Collingwood does’. See Michael 
Oakeshott on Hobbes: A Study in the Renewal of Philosophical Ideas (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 
2003), p. 13. Paul Franco goes even further: ‘What exactly this means or involves is not yet 
clear.’ The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 
p. 88.
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1. Reason and Nature.
2. Will and Artifice.
3. Rational Will.
Despite the capital letters, he could have hardly have chosen worse names: 
they are neither memorable nor revealing. (There is good reason to think that 
the name of anything should be either memorable or revealing). They tell us 
almost nothing in themselves, and Oakeshott’s explanation of each is minimal 
to a fault. It is only when he comes to the third tradition that he uses the word 
which gives us the clue to unravel his meaning, and also adds a mordant com-
ment which makes it clear that he does not think that the history of political 
philosophy should be coerced into anything like a simple philosophy of politi-
cal history. To deal with the second of these points first, he says: 
Its followers may be excused the belief that in it the truths of the first two 
traditions are fulfilled and their errors find a happy release.
This is, I think, a clear, if delicate, rebuttal of any Hegelian conviction that 
the third tradition amounts to a third stage which sublates – negates, assimi-
lates and transforms – the first and second forms into a higher and harmoni-
ous form. Whatever Oakeshott is doing here (and I am surprised to see just 
how many commentators quote this, without noting the evident irony, and go 
on to say that Oakeshott himself was sanctioning the idea of reconciliation 
in the third),5 it is not sanctioning any historical achievement. The arrival of 
Hegel, Oakeshott means to say, did not make it unnecessary to read Plato and 
Hobbes. On the contrary: the entire history remains alive in our consciousness: 
it remains a hinterland of contradictory visions which we may always explore 
to our benefit. 
When I say that he uses a word which enables us to unravel his meaning, it 
is one of the quieter words in this passage. It is the word ‘analogy’. This word 
alone should be enough to dispel any doubt that Oakeshott was in this pas-
sage indebted to Collingwood’s Idea of Nature. But what we have to note is 
that there is not only an analogy which helps us make sense of the third tradi-
tion; there are also analogies which help us make sense of the first and second. 
5   See, for instance, some of the contributors (Boucher and Podoksik) in The Cambridge 
Companion to Michael Oakeshott ed. Efraim Podoksik (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp. 250 & 287–8.
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II How This Is Indebted to Collingwood’s Three Views of Science from 
The Idea of Nature (1945)
Collingwood’s Idea of Nature, is, as the title suggests, a contribution to the his-
tory of philosophy of science rather than the history of the philosophy of poli-
tics. Collingwood made a late contribution to political philosophy – including 
some reflections on its history, which we shall consider below – in The New 
Leviathan, published in 1942. That was the last work published in his lifetime. 
On his death in 1943, there were several manuscripts ready for publication. 
T.M. Knox published The Idea of Nature in 1945 and The Idea of History in 1946.6 
Collingwood’s reputation is still so much tied to The Idea of History, along 
with The Autobiography of 1939, that it is sometimes hard to convince any-
one that these works are considerably less interesting than the early system, 
Speculum Mentis of 1924, the two great original works of philosophy, An Essay 
on Philosophical Method of 1933 and An Essay on Metaphysics of 1940, or even 
The Idea of Nature, which, if anything, shows a grasp of complexity (as well a 
determination to understand matters remote from his own interests) which 
makes it a greater achievement than the historical writings. 
Unlike The Idea of History which simply considers a series of historians in 
succession, The Idea of Nature proposes an architectonic view of the history 
of science, or, more properly, the understanding of nature. There is no indica-
tion in this book that Collingwood recognised that his ideas could be applied 
to the history of politics, though they obviously could be so applied. As we 
shall see there is some evidence of this scheme in The New Leviathan, though 
nothing quite as arresting as Oakeshott’s short utterance. So let us consider 
the argument about science. Whereas Oakeshott rather cautiously wrote of 
‘traditions’, Collingwood more simply wrote as if the shifts in viewpoint were 
collective and enabled us to distinguish stages in history. He wrote of ‘three 
periods of constructive cosmological thinking’,7 which he distinguished as 
‘The Greek View of Nature’, ‘The Renaissance View of Nature’ and ‘The Modern 
View of Nature’. He did not suppose that the entire history of thought could be 
fitted into this structure, but he certainly thought he was discussing the only 
developments of any significance in the European tradition. Indeed, the entire 
structure of his book was intended to indicate that with each transition phi-
losophers had moved from one way of thinking to another. This should not be 
6   For the composition of The Idea of Nature between 1933 and 1939 see David Boucher, 
‘The Principles of History and the Cosmological Conclusion to The Idea of Nature’, Collingwood 
and British Idealism Studies 2 (1995), pp. 140–74, at p. 146.
7   R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), p. 1.
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forgotten: whereas Collingwood tended to favour accounts of historical stages 
of the sort familiar from a Hegelian type of philosophy of history (and else-
where, in Speculum Mentis, conceptual stages of the sort familiar from Hegel’s 
other writings), Oakeshott’s dialectic was subtler. It contemplated not a simple 
succession of stages, but tortured entanglements of tradition. (Collingwood’s 
was of course a shorthand, and we do not need to be too critical of it: the 
point is more to recognise that Oakeshott was clearly critical about it: he never 
allowed himself to write as if there were stages in history.) 
In The Idea of Nature, Collingwood argued that at certain critical points in 
the past there was a ruling analogy which enabled men to explain nature. The 
first was that of the Greeks, who had assumed that ‘the world of nature is satu-
rated or permeated by mind’, so that mind and matter are indistinguishable, 
and so the laws by which the world orders itself are its own.8 The second was 
that of the Renaissance (a convenient term, by which he mostly meant not the 
fourteenth or fifteenth centuries but the sixteenth and seventeenth), in which, 
on the contrary, it was assumed that ‘the natural world is a machine’, so that 
mind and matter are distinguished, and laws are imposed on nature from out-
side, by a creator.9 ‘The Renaissance thinkers, like the Greeks, saw in the order-
liness of the natural world an expression of intelligence; but for the Greeks 
this intelligence was nature’s own intelligence, for the Renaissance thinkers 
it was the intelligence of something other than nature: the divine creator and 
ruler of nature.’10 Collingwood supposed that this was in a sense part of the 
long legacy of the Christian incarnation of word in the world. The third view 
was that of the Moderns. Initially, when writing of the first and second views, 
Collingwood did not mention the word analogy, but when he summarised 
them as he approached the third view it is clear that each view depended on 
an analogy. Again, I quote at length to establish the point:11
8    Ibid., p. 3.
9    Ibid., pp. 4–5.
10   Ibid., p. 5.
11    I also quote Collingwood here to avoid falling into the trap many Collingwood and 
Oakeshott scholars fall into which is of engaging in exposition in the form of paraphrase. 
This seems to be a stage Oakeshott and Collingwood scholarship is going through. 
Perhaps, if knowledge of their writings cannot be taken for granted, then exposi-
tion through paraphrase is necessary or useful: but it enables the scholars to be rather 
uncritical at times, since it becomes hard for the uninitiated reader to distinguish the 
exposition of the original literature from the criticism of it. This, no doubt, is because 
most Oakeshott and Collingwood scholars continue – with good reason – to be partisan 
for Oakeshott and Collingwood. This is a case where usually one can trust a man’s enemies 
better than his friends. Even the most subtle partisan is susceptible to this doubt: that he 
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The Greek view of nature as an intelligent organism was based on an 
analogy: an analogy between the world of nature and the individual 
human being, who begins by finding certain characteristics in himself 
as an individual, and goes on to think of nature as possessed of similar 
characteristics . . . The Renaissance view of nature as a machine is equally 
analogical in origin, but it presupposes a quite different order of ideas. 
First, it is based on the Christian idea of a creative and omnipotent God. 
[At this point, we may well recall Oakeshott’s rather more mordant and 
even modern ‘Israel and Islam’.] Secondly, it is based on the human expe-
rience of designing and constructing machines . . . It was an easy step to 
the proposition: as a clockmaker or millwright is to a clock or mill, so is 
God to Nature.12
He continued:
Modern cosmology, like its predecessors, is based on an analogy. As 
Greek natural science was based on the analogy between the macro-
cosm nature and the microcosm man, as man is revealed to himself in 
his own self-consciousness; as Renaissance natural science was based 
on the analogy between nature as God’s handiwork and the machines 
that are the handiwork of man . . .; so the modern view of nature, which 
first begins to find expression towards the end of the eighteenth century 
and ever since then has been gathering weight and establishing itself 
more securely down to the present day, is based on the analogy between 
the processes of the natural world as studied by natural scientists and the 
vicissitudes of human affairs as studied by historians.13
This particular analogy was only possible once history was established as a 
fundamental category of thought, which, Collingwood said – a point no one 
would now argue with – was in the eighteenth century.14 He suggested that 
scientists began to recognise that objects continually change. (Darwin, is of 
course, exemplary here: but the recognition was everywhere: in Hegel, Comte, 
Lyell, Marx and countless others.) Collingwood went on in the following pages 
to explore the consequences of this point of view (the view that change was no 
is a friend, and therefore not an entirely honest commentator, and in a sense worse than 
an enemy, whose dishonesty is easier to discern. 
12   Ibid., pp. 8–9.
13   Ibid., p. 9.
14   Ibid., p. 10.
Downloaded from Brill.com12/24/2018 06:03:54PM
via Bilkent University
288 Alexander
journal of the philosophy of history 10 (2016) 279–303
longer cyclical but progressive, the view that nature was no longer mechani-
cal but organic, and so on). But we may leave The Idea of Nature here. The rest 
of the book was Collingwood’s determined driving of these three ideas through 
the history of the philosophy of science from Plato to Whitehead. 
Let me summarise the scheme:
1. The Greek View of Nature: founded on the Analogy of Man the Microcosm 
and Nature the Macrocosm.
2. The Renaissance View of Nature: founded on the Analogy of Man the 
Creator and God the Creator.
3. The Modern View of Nature: founded on the Analogy of Human History 
and Natural History. 
Oakeshott was clearly indebted to Collingwood. For just as Collingwood wrote 
of ‘the analogy between the processes of the natural world as studied by natu-
ral scientists and the vicissitudes of human affairs as studied by historians’, so 
Oakeshott wrote of ‘the world seen on the analogy of human history.’
Collingwood’s set of analogies enables us to explain Oakeshott’s otherwise 
obscure threefold. ‘Reason and Nature’ alludes to the fact that reason and 
nature are bound together through the analogy of macrocosm and microcosm. 
Man is, as Aristotle said, zoon politikon, a political animal. The state, there-
fore, is natural. ‘Will and Artifice’ alludes to the fact that there is an analogy 
between God’s will and man’s will: so that human creations are artificial, not 
natural. The state, therefore, is artificial. And ‘Rational Will’? This was clumsy. 
I think Oakeshott should have called the third tradition something else, if he 
had to insist on these sorts of terms. ‘History and Change’ or something equally 
bland would have done: something which emphasised the distinctively histori-
cal element. By calling it ‘Rational Will’ he tied it rather too tightly to some sort 
of Hegelian succession: which is ironic, since Oakeshott generally wanted to 
avoid such a succession. But the third tradition is broader than that. We all, 
as Collingwood rightly suggested, and not only Hegelians, have come to think 
this way. The point is that historical consciousness does not eliminate every-
thing which comes before, but it complicates it almightily – as everyone knows 
who has read or reflected on the works of Nietzsche, Gadamer, Koselleck or 
MacIntyre or, indeed, Collingwood and Oakeshott. 
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III Oakeshott’s Apparent Abandonment of the Political Threefold 
Except for a Few References in His Lectures (1966–67)
Oakeshott delivered lectures on the history of political thought throughout his 
life. In the lectures from 1966–67 which have recently been published he said 
that there are (or have been) three ways of conceptualising the state:
1. Natural: so that a ‘state’ is a ‘natural community’; or
2. Artificial: so that a ‘state’ is an artificial community; or
3. Neither natural nor artificial, strictly speaking, but something that par-
takes of both: so that a state is a ‘historic’ bond.15
Oakeshott commented that Aristotle, Bodin, Filmer and Montesquieu, among 
others, theorised the first (though even Hobbes had used the analogy of the 
state as a ‘body’);16 Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the second; and Hume, Burke 
and Hegel, among others, the third. It should be noted here that Oakeshott 
called these three ‘interpretations’: and, again, without saying so explicitly, was 
refusing to allow that the three should be considered successive stages. On the 
contrary, he emphasised that the second interpretation had ancient origins, 
and was manifest in the distinction of the divine and the human in Christianity, 
though it came to consciousness in the seventeenth century. However, when 
it did come to consciousness, ‘the intellectual disposition it reflected was the 
assumption that everything in the world is either “natural” or “artificial”.’17 For 
those who accepted that the state was artificial, the state was the ‘product of 
an act of association’.18 The third interpretation is ‘more difficult to describe’: 
‘it represents a breakout from the intellectual disposition which assumes that 
everything in the world must be either “natural” or “artificial”.19 The historical 
state is not natural because it is contingent, and it is not artificial because it 
is not made for a purpose. (Oakeshott mentions that according to the second 
interpretation, the state is made for a purpose, whether the subordination of 
15    Michael Oakeshott, Lectures in the History of Political Thought (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 
2006), p. 404. See pp. 404–25 for the entire discussion. David Boucher, whose paper I dis-
cuss below, notes the moments when Oakeshott uses the triad in his writings, especially 
the lectures, but appears to have missed this decisive passage on p. 404. See ‘Oakeshott 
and the History of Political Thought’, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 13 (2007). 
pp. 69–101.
16   Oakeshott, Lectures in the History of Political Thought, p. 405.
17   Ibid., p. 412.
18   Ibid., p. 416.
19   Ibid., p. 421.
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passion to reason, as in Rousseau, moral progress, as in Mill, or peace, as in 
Hobbes.)20 The state, according to this interpretation, is ‘forged by time and 
circumstance’. Here he mentions Ferguson, Hume, Coleridge, Vico, Herder, 
Savigny and Hegel, but especially Burke.
If we were to try to make sense of these three ideas of the state, then we 
could say that we have firstly the idea that the state exists because whatever 
does exist is a dim groping towards the true state. This is a view of the state as 
an end in the sense of a telos. Secondly, we have the idea that the state exists 
when and only when we consciously imagine it and artificially establish it: the 
state is not a telos, but something which emerges out of human activity. And 
thirdly, we have the idea that the state exists neither because it is necessary nor 
because we have established it but because we have come to have some sort of 
consciousness about its contingent emergence in our history. Oakeshott would 
probably say that all these are thinkable views of the state. The third is the emi-
nently modern way of thinking. It is not a Hegelian reconciliation of the first 
two: it is a ‘third way’: but nonetheless it is possible to admit that it includes 
the first two within itself. This should be a platitude to anyone who reflects 
on the nature of historical understanding: for something like the state, in terms 
of historical understanding, includes whatever we have understood the state 
to be in history: which means not only the ideas of the state which are them-
selves historical in content, but earlier, unhistorical, ideas of the state. 
It seems to me that this is a good way of thinking about the state. It is in 
terms of what we could call an unresolved or open dialectic. 
I should perhaps draw attention to the fact that the only scholar to have 
written about the triads in Collingwood and Oakeshott is himself eager to 
establish something like a triadic view of the history of political thought. 
This is Boucher, who has not only written a book about Collingwood, and 
articles about Oakeshott, but a book about ‘political theories of international 
relations’.21 This last book is evidently much used by scholars of international 
relations; but it is unlikely that many readers of the book have noticed its 
20    Here, against Noel Malcolm, ‘Oakeshott and Hobbes’, in A Companion to Michael Oakeshott 
ed. Paul Franco and Leslie Marsh (Penn State University Press, 2012), pp. 217–31, it is 
necessary to say Oakeshott appears to recognise that Hobbes’s political philosophy has 
a teleology. Malcolm ignores the threefold architectonic which prevents Oakeshott from 
ever doing anything as simple as associating his own theory, which is necessarily that of 
the third interpretation, with Hobbes’s, which is that of the second. So when Malcolm 
comments, as if against Oakeshott, ‘there was, underlying Hobbes’s concept of the state, 
a substantive aim: peace’, on p. 229, he is saying something Oakeshott certainly recognised.
21    David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present 
(Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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emphatically triadic structure. Boucher distinguishes three rival and to some 
extent successive traditions. He calls them:
1. The tradition of ‘empirical realism’: which he associates with 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Marsilius and Hobbes.
2. The tradition of ‘universal moral order’: which he associates with the 
Stoics, Cicero, Christianity, Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke and Kant.
3. The tradition of historical reason: which he associates with Rousseau, 
Burke, Hegel, Marx, and almost everyone else since.
These are obviously Oakeshott’s three traditions of reflection on politics, in 
turn derived from Collingwood’s three successive views of nature. The only dif-
ference is that – perhaps for the sake of his own dialectic suggestion – Boucher 
reverses the order of the first and second. Boucher tells us that ‘the traditions 
stand in dialectical relation to each other . . .’22 The first involves the view that 
humans are ‘radically subjective’ autonomous creatures of sense, with their 
own interests, living in a world constituted by conflicts of interest. The second 
involves the view that humans are ruled by universal principles of justice. This 
is generally optimistic whereas the first is pessimistic: and it has a far closer 
relation to philosophy and theology than the first.23 These two are 
antithetical; they are polar opposites. Realism postulates interest and 
expediency as criteria of state action, while the tradition of a Universal 
Moral Order postulates conformity to rule or principle: the former is a 
finite, empirical and pragmatic criterion; and the latter universal, gener-
alised, and abstract. Each is one-sided in that it cannot accommodate the 
insights of the other, yet each has a positive value in over-emphasising an 
aspect of what motivates the actions of states.24
The third, Boucher tells us, overcomes the deficiencies of both. (Though 
I certainly think that it has its own difficulties: of which the major one is 
that almost every theory of the third type – except Hegel’s, or perhaps even 
Hegel’s! – is riddled with compromise.)25 Boucher characterises the third by 
22   Ibid., p. 23.
23   Ibid., pp. 29 & 33.
24   Ibid., p. 36.
25    For an exploration of this line of thought in a different context see my essay ‘The 
Fundamental Contradiction of Modern Cosmopolitanism’ (forthcoming in European 
Legacy).
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saying that it involves the view that ‘human nature is not a fixed entity’. All soci-
eties are ‘historical societies’.26 Boucher finds this view originating in Vico, but 
finds it particularly applied to politics in Rousseau. He suggests that it is now 
ubiquitous: and he offers an interesting view of everyone up to and including 
Habermas and Rawls in these terms. ‘The same substantive end is desired by 
many political theorists of international relations: an extension of the moral 
community which posits a certain degree of universalism, while at the same 
time seeking to preserve difference and respect for diverse identities.’27
I draw attention to the structure of Boucher’s book because it would not be 
obvious to anyone not looking for it. Perhaps Boucher knows that few scholars 
would be able to accept it as a structuring hermeneutic, so he is inclined to 
present as much as possible as a finding which emerges out of consideration of 
countless texts. But from his other writings it is clear that Boucher is well aware 
of what he is doing. 
In an article on Oakeshott, he quotes in appendix the entire passage from 
the introduction to Leviathan, and attempts to discover the extent to which 
Oakeshott used the triadic structure in his own writings. Boucher rightly notes 
that Oakeshott used it hardly at all. He argues, I think wrongly, that Oakeshott 
reserved the triad for thinking about ‘masterpieces’ of political philosophy, like 
those of Plato, Hobbes and Hegel, and not for ‘political thought’ as such.28 This 
seems unlikely. It is more likely that Oakeshott simply thought the structure 
he found in Collingwood in 1945 a useful way of dramatising the significance 
of Hobbes when he came to write about him in 1946. There is hardly any sign 
in Oakeshott’s lecture, and next to no sign in his published writings, that he 
thought it worth pressing the claim for this philosophy of political history 
any harder. It was simply an eminently thinkable suggestion, thrown up more 
or less casually: Oakeshott was clearly capable of such suggestiveness in his 
writings. And Boucher does rightly note that by the time Oakeshott came to 
write On Human Conduct he preferred to theorise in terms of two absolutely 
irreconcilable traditions (societas and universitas) rather than in terms of three 
traditions in which the third was to some extent, and no matter how loosely, 
a reconciliation of the first two. I see this as a sign of the declining Hegelian 
structure of Oakeshott’s thought. Anyone who expresses himself in terms of an 
unreconciled dyad has certainly got a certain distance from Hegel.
Boucher rightly observes that others found more in the scheme than 
Oakeshott himself did: ‘This was a conception of the history of  political 
26   Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, p. 37.
27   Ibid., p. 395.
28   Boucher, ‘Oakeshott and the History of Political Thought’, p. 79 ff.
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 philosophy, with variations of one sort or another, that recommended 
itself to many adept followers of Oakeshott, foremost among whom [was] 
W.H. Greenleaf.’
Greenleaf himself suggest[ed] that T.D. Weldon characterised the first 
two traditions as the ‘organic’ and the ‘mechanical’ views of man; and 
Ernst Cassirer name[d] them ‘intellectualism’ and ‘voluntarism’. In 
addition, Arthur Lovejoy recognise[d] them as the traditions of 
‘Otherworldliness’ and ‘Thisworldliness’; and Dante Germino, an admirer 
of Oakeshott, follow[ed] Jacques Maritain in referring to them as 
‘Theocentric Human’ and ‘Anthropocentric Humanism’.29
But only Greenleaf attempted to make something of Oakeshott’s threefold. 
In the 1970s he observed, rightly, that the history of political thought should 
not be ‘a mere chronology of ideas’. So he followed Oakeshott in finding ‘three 
styles of discussion’ evident in the history of political thought, which should 
properly be thought of as ‘a logically connected series of [three] paradigms’: 
‘the relationship between them is that standards of the first two are, in prin-
ciple, antithetical, while that initiated and addressed by Rousseau unites and 
completes both.’30 
Apart from Greenleaf and Boucher, almost no one has made use of this 
scheme. There is evidence Oakeshott thought it would not work.31 I think 
Boucher, in his eagerness to make something of the scheme, does not say clearly 
enough that though the scheme may have seemed attractive to Oakeshott in 
1946, it was no more than a suggestion proposed only for its suggestiveness, 
and which was forgotten by the time he came to write the book originally 
arranged by Collingwood for Oxford University Press but not published until 
1975. Boucher is fond of suggesting that the triad was common to all ideal-
ists from Hegel through Bosanquet and Green to Oakeshott and Collingwood.32 
To be sure, it is implicit in much: but it was not explicit until Oakeshott and 
Collingwood: who themselves soon dropped it, or at least interpreted it in 
29   Ibid., p. 76.
30    W.H. Greenleaf, ‘Hume, Burke and the General Will’, Political Studies 20 (1972), 131–40, at 
p. 140. See also David Boucher, ‘W.H. Greenleaf: Idealism and the Triadic Conception of 
the History of Political Thought’, Idealistic Studies 16 (1986), pp. 237–52.
31    Boucher, ‘Oakeshott and the History of Political Thought’, p. 93, quoting a letter from 
Oakeshott.
32    David Boucher, The Social and Political Thought of R.G. Collingwood (Cambridge, 1989), 
p. 73.
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different ways even when they advocated it. I will deal with Collingwood, to 
illustrate this point, in the next section. As far as Oakeshott is concerned, we 
must suppose that he thought that Hegelian reconciliation was no longer a 
suitable vehicle for his form of scepticism. Better than triads were dyads.
Dyads are still popular. Take Raymond Geuss, reflecting ‘On the Very Idea of 
a Metaphysics of Right’ in 2010. He supposes that we may see any interaction 
of humans in two ways, either as ‘an instance of a set of rules, principles or for-
mal procedures’, or in terms of ‘the motives, intentions and goals of the agents 
involved’.33 These are the first two terms of Oakeshott’s scheme of 1946, as if 
the third does not exist, or is just a proper way of appreciating of the second. 
Historians of political thought have tended to be sceptical of all such schemes. 
Quentin Skinner reviewed Greenleaf ’s Order, Empiricism, Politics in 1966, and 
commented: ‘If there are “traditions” of political thinking, they appear to be 
both richer and more confused than Dr Greenleaf ’s analysis can allow.’34 But 
this would apply to Geuss’s scheme as well as Greenleaf ’s. And I think that 
although we have to acknowledge the force of Skinner’s comment, we also have 
to recognise that if we thought it was the only truth then we would in effect be 
sanctioning only one half of what Plato in the Phaedrus thought was proper 
philosophical procedure: we would be collecting instances but not dividing 
the categories which enable us to make sense of those instances. 
This might be all there was to say. But I want to add what might seem a 
digression about Collingwood’s own political philosophy. This will enable us 
to say a bit more about the possible significance of finding patterns in history.
IV The Oddity of Collingwood’s Alternative Threefold Philosophy of 
Political History in New Leviathan (1942)
Part of the claim here is that it is important to know if someone has a phi-
losophy of political history. If they do, then it is necessary to understand this 
before one attempts to understand their political philosophy. So the scholastic 
question about whether Oakeshott owes more to Hegel or Hobbes is modi-
fied once we say that all the questions are secondary compared to his sense 
of their location in history. Oakeshott could not agree with Hobbes, since his 
philosophy of political history prevented him: quite simply we exist after the 
33    Geuss, ‘On the Very Idea of a Metaphysics of Right’, Politics and the Imagination (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 43–60.
34    Quentin Skinner, ‘On Two Traditions of English Political Thought’ (a review of Greenleaf) 
Historical Journal 9 (1966), pp. 136–9, at p. 139.
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 eighteenth-century arrival of a historical consciousness. Neither could he agree 
simply with Hegel: although agreement with Hegel is easier, since he wrote 
after the arrival of historical consciousness. He thought we are later, and differ-
ent, and are in the condition of being able to see the traditions winding back 
behind us. We can no longer suppose that Hegel’s reconciliations can work; 
even though it is true that his dialectic still offers us a compelling model of 
what a reconciliation might be if we thought the dialectic evident in history 
was susceptible to reconciliation, rather than, simply, to understanding in its 
fragments and contradictions.
Collingwood’s philosophy of political history – the one evident in The New 
Leviathan, published in 1942, a few years before Oakeshott’s ‘Introduction to 
Leviathan’ – is interesting because it indicates how Collingwood could pro-
pose a triadic scheme rather different from Oakeshott’s. Collingwood’s philos-
ophy of political history was not a rendering of his history of his philosophy of 
nature into politics. Oakeshott stole from Collingwood; but Collingwood did 
not steal from Collingwood. 
Before I begin, it should be noted that Collingwood was doing several things 
in The New Leviathan. One was to attempt to cover the same territory Hobbes 
had covered in Leviathan. A second was to put forward his own novel theory of 
utility, rules and duty. A third was to indicate why the Germans were barbar-
ians. It is the fourth which is of relevance here. This was to propose three laws 
of politics, which were a summary of his reinterpretation of what he called, 
a bit confusingly, ‘the classical politics’. By ‘classical politics’ he did not mean 
the politics of Plato and Aristotle; he meant the politics of Hobbes, Locke 
and Rousseau. And, unlike Oakeshott, who considered Hobbes the ‘head and 
crown’ of the second of three traditions, Collingwood considered Hobbes the 
creator of the third of three traditions. Hobbes was ‘by far the toughest and 
most resourceful, as well as the most original, of the thinkers’ he considered.35 
In an unpublished draft preface he wrote that Leviathan was ‘the first book 
in which the idea of a civilised society was consciously and systematically 
expounded’.36 In the published preface Leviathan was ‘the world’s greatest 
store of political wisdom’.37 Now, we cannot understand why unless we see 
where Hobbes came in Collingwood’s philosophy of political history.
In order to understand Collingwood’s philosophy of political history we 
have to understand his distinctive use of the terms ‘society’, ‘community’ and 
35   R.G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1943), p. 261.
36    R.G. Collingwood, Essays in Political Philosophy ed. David Boucher (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), p. 228.
37   Collingwood, The New Leviathan, p. lx.
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‘non-social community’. In short, community is simply the entire social body, 
society is the part of the community which is capable of ruling itself – having 
achieved a requisite level of education or civilisation – and ‘non-social com-
munity’ is the part of that community which is not capable of ruling itself and 
therefore needs to be ruled by others. (Later in the book he calls them ‘the 
herd’, and suggests the German ‘herd-worship’ is a sign that Germans don’t 
understand politics.) His philosophy of political history was in terms of the 
question ‘What is the body politic?’ This question had been answered in three 
ways at three different times.
First, as we might expect, were the Greeks, and also Romans. They thought 
that the body politic is society. For them, the polis was ‘a society made up of 
citizens upon whom non-citizens were dependent’.38 
Second, and this is Collingwood’s novelty, were the writers of the Middle 
Ages. ‘In the Middle Ages a body politic was conceived as a non-social com-
munity; . . . a collective name for people born in a certain place.’39
Third came Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. It is worth quoting again one of 
the most arresting short passages ever written about politics. Here he is dis-
cussing what he called the account of a body politic given by ‘the classical 
politics’:
What is a body politic? Is it, as the Greeks believed, a society of citizens 
corporately ruling themselves and having non-citizen dependants, wives, 
children, and so forth? or is it, as the Middles Ages thought, a non-social 
community, a human herd which strong men rule and good men would 
wish to rule well?
Hobbes said: ‘It is both.’40
It is both because Hobbes was a dialectician, reconciling the two earlier views. 
‘The medieval account’, continued Collingwood, ‘represents the starting-point 
of the change, the Greek account the finishing-point. Between these two 
points it is always moving, and the movement is what constitutes the life of 
the body politic.’41
So, in short, Collingwood’s philosophy of political history, also has three 
stages – stages, not traditions, since Collingwood tended always to be less cau-
tious than Oakeshott in that respect – but it places Hobbes at the head of the 
38   Ibid., p. 178.
39   Ibid., p. 179.
40   Ibid., p. 180.
41   Ibid., pp. 180–1.
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third, not the second. This, of course, means that Collingwood, perhaps surpris-
ingly, did not talk very much about how the arrival of a historical conscious-
ness affected political philosophy. It seems, perhaps, that he thought it did not. 
Or perhaps he had reason not to go into that particular matter in 1942. For the 
far more obvious thing about New Leviathan is the way Hegel is continually dis-
paraged in comparison to Hobbes. If Oakeshott placed Hegel at the head of the 
third tradition, Collingwood simply has him as one of the Germans who more 
or less failed to understand the classical politics. Collingwood’s relative playing 
down of Hegel is striking. He credited Plato with the invention of dialectic.42 
Then he suggested that Hegel had misused the dialectic. And he claimed that 
Hobbes’s conception of politics was dialectical. ‘According to Hobbes (though 
Hobbes seems hardly to have recognised Plato’s work on the subject) a body 
politic is a dialectical thing.’43 This is quite remarkable. In Collingwood’s three-
fold division in what I am calling his philosophy of political history, the third 
reconciliatory stage was granted not to Hegel but to Hobbes: and Collingwood 
went so far as to suggest that Hobbes in Leviathan, and not Hegel, achieved a 
dialectic resolution of politics. 
In the chapter entitled ‘The Classical Physics and the Classical Politics’ 
Collingwood explored the relation between science as it was practiced by 
Galileo, Bacon, Descartes and Newton, and politics as it was understood 
by Hobbes. He contrasted this ‘classical physics’ with the understanding of 
science which existed at the time of Plato and Aristotle. The difference was, he 
suggested, that ancient science had an ‘unlimited objective’.44 By this he meant 
that when an ancient scientist tried to define anything (‘What is Nature?’ ‘What 
is Man?’ ‘What is Justice?’) he sought to give a substantive definition of the 
thing, to capture its essence. But modern scientists since Galileo had attempted 
to have a ‘limited objective’. They tried to avoid asking great and vague ques-
tions which could not be answered, and settled for discussing what could be 
measured or observed. In the same way, suggests Collingwood, ‘the authors 
of the classical politics did not aim at explaining all political facts whatever’: 
what they did instead was to only explain ‘society’ and not explain ‘non-social 
community’. For them, this non-social community, which they called ‘a state of 
nature’ was a simple negation, a negation of the order which could be achieved 
in society. They sought ‘to study the social elements in political life.’45
42   Ibid., pp. 181–2.
43   Ibid., p. 183.
44   Ibid., p. 253.
45   Ibid., p. 254.
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I do not have the inclination to go into why Collingwood was so hostile to 
the German philosophers. It is enough to say that he admired Hobbes for the 
open, unresolved dialectic: for Hobbes there was no reconciliation, only an 
endless dialectic between ‘art’ and ‘nature’, with art attempting to establish the 
‘classical politics’ in the face of the continual possibility that ‘society might 
break up into a non-social community’. ‘We who no longer believe in a law of 
progress find it delightful after wading back through the bog of nineteenth-
century wish-fulfilment fantasies, that Hobbes did not believe in it either.’46 
And on the Germans, he thought that part of the problem was their admira-
tion for the original political theories of the Greeks: ‘The revival of Greek phi-
losophy by the German romanticists was in one thing at least a disaster: it gave 
the Germans (and their followers) what they mistakenly thought good author-
ity for rejecting the classical politics; which in fact they rejected because, 
owing to their country’s social and political backwardness, they could not 
understand it.’
Collingwood’s account of German philosophy, and Hegel, in New Leviathan 
is interesting, if unfair. We can understand why he wrote it. But the major ques-
tion must be why he ignored his own discovery in The Idea of Nature, which 
was that the view of science had been altered by an analogy with history in the 
eighteenth century: a revolution which could not be reversed. If this were true, 
then it is surely significant that he ignored this development in his political 
philosophy, and instead aligned the most advanced theory of politics with the 
physics of the seventeenth century. Admittedly, he wrote of the classical poli-
tics: ‘Like the classical physics it can no longer be regarded as containing the 
last word about its subject.’ But he also wrote: ‘Not having found its Einstein it 
cannot be regarded as definitely superseded.’47 In other words, Collingwood – 
as the title of his book suggests – really thought that political philosophy should 
concern itself with minor adjustments to Hobbes’s Leviathan, and that what 
I am calling here the philosophy of political history ended, in its major divi-
sions, for the time being, with Hobbes (as adjusted, perhaps, by Collingwood). 
As Collingwood put it in his lectures in 1921: ‘The task is to think on from Plato 
to Hobbes and then from Hobbes to something new which shall overcome the 
defects in Hobbes’.48
46   Ibid., p. 262.
47   Ibid., p. 247.
48   Quoted in Boucher, The Social and Political Thought of R.G. Collingwood, p. 67.
Downloaded from Brill.com12/24/2018 06:03:54PM
via Bilkent University
 299THE PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL HISTORY
journal of the philosophy of history 10 (2016) 279–303
V Conclusion: How We Have to Try to Make Sense of the Philosophy 
of Political History Before We Make Sense of Political Philosophy
I have tried to show here that Oakeshott had a philosophy of political history, 
that it was a threefold, that he derived it from Collingwood’s threefold phi-
losophy of scientific history in Idea of Nature, even though Collingwood him-
self did not use it when putting forward his own threefold of politics in New 
Leviathan. The irony is that in The New Leviathan Collingwood suggested that 
there was an analogy between the ‘classical physics’ – by which he meant the 
natural science of the seventeenth century – and the ‘classical politics’ – by 
which he meant the political science of the seventeenth century, but that he 
himself in that book did not pursue the implication of his own argument of 
The Idea of Nature, which was that the natural science of the seventeenth cen-
tury was a second paradigm which had been supplanted or supplemented by 
a third which emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Oakeshott did sometimes pursue this implication: first of all in the paragraph 
I have quoted, and which many other scholars quote, from the ‘Introduction 
to Leviathan’, and also in the lectures he gave in 1966–7 and which were pub-
lished for the first time in 2006. But it is hard to consider he made much of it. It 
is not in On Human Conduct, for instance. So, apart from revivals in Greenleaf 
and Boucher, these threefolds of the philosophy of political history have disap-
peared from view since the 1940s.
One obvious reason might be that in offering a threefold history one can 
always disagree about the exact moment of reconciliation or the figure associ-
ated with it. Oakeshott in 1946 clearly thought Hegel was the reconciliatory 
figure; whereas a few years before Collingwood clearly thought it was Hobbes. 
But this is less important than the fact that Oakeshott and Collingwood both 
offered rival threefold philosophies of political history.
Oakeshott’s philosophy of political history was:
1. Politics in history was first understood as something natural, because of 
an analogy between the mind of man and the mind of the universe, so 
that the mind of the universe flowed through the mind of man, so that 
science could enable us to understand politics just as it could understand 
nature, and did so because politics was natural to man: the polis was sup-
posed to emerge naturally in human history and yet also be the telos of 
human activity.
2. Politics was then understood as something artificial, to be contrasted 
with the world of nature, the analogy now being the one between nature 
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as God’s creation and the various artifices of man’s creation: which 
included the state. Since nature was separate from art, and since science 
could only tell us about nature, politics was not a science, or, if it was a 
science, it was the science of understanding the contingent and arbitrary, 
if practically necessary, decision made by humans to intervene in the 
world of nature to create an artificial order called political.
3. Politics was finally understood as something historical, neither to be con-
trasted with nature, nor to form a continuity with it, but to be in some 
way both artificial and natural: here the analogy was between nature as 
having a mutable changeable history and politics as having a mutable 
changeable history; so that politics and the state were historical emer-
gences, neither wholly matters of art or of nature, but of historic experi-
ence, usually dependent on decisions wholly lost in time and established 
only in our traditions and subsequent criticisms of them, and the tradi-
tions which emerged as criticism had a dialectical effect on the original 
traditions.
Collingwood’s philosophy of political history was:
1. Politics was first understood as only concerning the citizens of the city: 
where the citizens were those who could rule themselves, and leaving all 
others out of account.
2. Politics was then understood as concerning all of the inhabitants of the 
state: where all of these inhabitants were included in politics and consid-
ered to be in need of being ruled.
3. Politics was finally understood as somehow both concerning those who 
can rule themselves and those who are in need of rule: ‘It is both’. It is the 
means by which those who cannot rule themselves relate to those who 
rule in such a way that they are continually educated into a position 
where they can actually or ideally rule themselves, though we are not to 
expect that this education will ever cease or ever be completed. In this 
sense the first understanding is the end of politics, and the second is the 
beginning.
Oakeshott associated his threefold with 
1. Plato, 
2. Hobbes and 
3. Hegel, 
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while Collingwood associated his threefold with
1. Plato, 
2. the Middle Ages and 
3. Hobbes. 
What both philosophies of history had was the suggestion that the third of 
the three was a dialectical reconciliation of the first two, though incomplete. 
Collingwood’s was simpler, and far more ingenious: far more original, though 
also far more questionable, for the reason that he supposed that his threefold 
formed stages or moments, whereas Oakeshott supposed that his formed tradi-
tions. Collingwood thought that, politically speaking, the nineteenth century 
had involved an error, and that in the future it was necessary to return to the 
‘classical politics’ of the seventeenth century. Ironically, he did this by making 
Hobbes the culmination of a dialectical history. This was a Hegelian history 
with Hobbes and not Hegel as its central character. Oakeshott, on the other 
hand, kept Hegel as the culmination, but put a question mark against the view 
that it was anything other than an apparently philosophical culmination, and 
himself seems to have preferred the view that in a contestation of rival tradi-
tions there was no winner in history, least of all Hegel. This was a Hegelian his-
tory which, in transcending Hegel, also indicated that there was good reason 
to consider Hobbes seriously and not consider him historically outmoded. On 
that point – the point that Hobbes should be taken seriously – both men were 
agreed. And on the other point – that some sort of philosophy of political his-
tory was a contribution to understanding, and that it should take dialectical 
form – both men were agreed. 
Now, we may well ask why Hobbes and Hegel are so significant for both 
Collingwood and Oakeshott. This is related to a question we should ask our-
selves, which is why Hobbes and Hegel should be significant for us. The answer 
is that if we know both Hobbes and Hegel – and not just one of them (the 
weakness of Skinner is his lack of appreciation of Hegel, the weakness of Taylor 
is his lack of appreciation of Hobbes) – is that Hobbes brings to consciousness 
(in the opening pages of De Cive alone, but of course throughout the pages 
of Leviathan) that consciousness, meaning his consciousness but also, he sup-
posed, and we may suppose rightly, our consciousness was shifting from an 
older to a newer stage (if we prefer the Collingwoodian view) or forcibly con-
trasting a second tradition with a first (if we prefer the Oakeshottian view); and 
that Hegel brings to consciousness the fact that the Hobbesian position was 
incomplete for the historical reason that history did not end in 1651 and for the 
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philosophical reason that the rivalry between these two traditions was so radi-
cal it required, at the very least, further thought and, it was to be hoped, some 
sort of means by which they could be reconciled. Hobbes makes it clear to us 
that the classical tradition had not closed all questions and Hegel made it clear 
to us that the challenge to the classical tradition had itself not closed all ques-
tions. This way of seeing the philosophy of political history is so cumulatively 
powerful – even if we do not think, as Hegel did, that resolution was possible 
(and we may, of course, disagree with Hegel for historical or for philosophi-
cal reasons) – that we can see why Oakeshott thought that those who under-
stood Hegel could be excused their belief that in the nineteenth century all 
the riddles of the seventeenth century AD and the fourth century BC had been 
resolved. We know better: as Collingwood and Oakeshott did. But reflection on 
politics, if it is to involve reflection on history and philosophy, must, I think, 
begin with understanding the fact that the history of political philosophy is 
not a meaningless or arbitrary set of reflections on miscellaneous experiences 
but is, in great measure, a philosophy of political history which can be unrav-
elled, seen as a whole, and admired and lamented for what it has left us with in 
our twenty-first century. 
It is still rare to see explicit philosophies of political history. I think there 
should be more. The one sketched here has found a few adherents, even in 
unexpected places. It is possible that Bobbio was influenced by Oakeshott 
in his book Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, where he described 
the history of political philosophy in terms of three ‘tracks’, the first of which 
was ‘Aristotelian’, the second ‘Hobbesian’, the third ‘Hegelian’. 
The Hegelian system is so inclusive as to leave out nothing essential of 
the previous systems . . . until Hegel, the whole tradition of political phi-
losophy proceeded on two parallel tracks: the Aristotelian track, based on 
the pair family/state; and the Hobbesian track, based on the pair state of 
nature/civil society, Hegel is the first (and last) to merge the two models 
in his system . . . He can perform this operation because he articulates his 
system in triads rather than pairs.49 
The addition Bobbio makes is to suggest that Hegel was both first and last to 
do this. The point is not that we should imagine this philosophy of history as 
a succession of stages, but rather as an intertwining of traditions in which cer-
tain great recognitions are historically foundational for what comes  afterwards. 
49    Norberto Bobbio, ‘The Conceptual Model of Natural Law Theory’ in Thomas Hobbes and 
the Natural Law Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 1–23, p. 24.
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In this sense, they are ‘events’ in Zizek’s or Badiou’s sense: ruptures in the his-
tory of political philosophy, which not only condition everything which comes 
afterwards but everything which came before. Zizek in his recent book Event 
suggested that the ‘three (and only three) key philosophers in the history of 
Western metaphysics’ were Plato, Descartes and Hegel.50 But since, as Tuck 
put it, Descartes was ‘one of the few major philosophers never to write on 
politics’,51 it is important to recognise the power of the claim that the three 
key philosophers in the history of Western political philosophy were Plato, 
Hobbes (Descartes’s great contemporary and rival), and Hegel. This philoso-
phy of political history could and certainly should be characterised further. 
In addition, alternatives could be explored. There is no reason to limit our-
selves to Plato, Hobbes and Hegel. Other lineages could be explored. Al-Khidr, 
Moses and Aristotle, perhaps. Or Lao-Tzu, Confucius and Montesquieu. And 
others could be admitted. There are many recent writers who probably hoped 
they would be a third in a dialectical threefold of which the first two elements 
were Rawls and Nozick. And probably now some even more recent writers 
would prefer to ignore Nozick, and instead consider Rawls and one of these 
other writers the first two elements of a triad including themselves, so we 
would have Rawls, Sandel and a third, Rawls, Sen and a third, Rawls, Cohen 
and a third, or even now Rawls, Geuss and a third. Admittedly, these might 
be fairly poor ones. Yet every triad would suggest a novel axis for a possible 
philosophy of political history. (Though the more modern the figures named, 
the poorer any philosophy of political history would be as history.) The point 
is that we have philosophies of political history whether we know it or not: 
sometimes very poor ones. Political philosophy would benefit from a slightly 
clearer consciousness about this fact. Philosophies of political history should 
be admitted, identified, even encouraged. They would enable us to recognise 
the reflexive relation we all have to the entire canon, or set of canons, as they 
now increasingly are. I think this sort of recognition is a precondition of saying 
anything at all valuable in political philosophy. 
Nothing dogmatic should follow from this. I noted earlier that the first word 
of Oakeshott’s paragraph is a conditional ‘If ’, and this is why we may consider 
the philosophy of political history to be a completely open form. This sort of 
philosophy of history imposes nothing final on history. For every philosophy 
of history depends on an axis of conditionality – including, it should be obvi-
ous, Oakeshott’s.
50   Slavoj Zizek, Event: Philosophy in Transit (London: Penguin, 2014), p. 77.
51   Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 20.
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